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Introduction
On December 31, 2019, the World Health Organization (WHO) learned of a “viral
pneumonia” in Wuhan, People’s Republic of China.1 This disease, named “SARS-CoV-2” or
“COVID-19”2 has since infected over thirty-six million people, killing over one million.3 One
way to impede the spread of this new disease is by contact tracing.4 Contact tracing is the process
of identifying everyone who may have come into contact with an infected individual.5 Contact
tracing can be performed manually or digitally.6 Manual contact tracing can take weeks to carry
out,7 whereas digital contact tracing has the potential to be faster and more efficient.8 Countries
in East Asia have used digital contact tracing, among other technologies, to effectively “flatten
the curve” of their COVID-19 infection rate,9 while the Americas accounted for the majority of

1

World Health Organization, Timeline: WHO’s COVID-19 response,
https://www.who.int/emergencies/diseases/novel-coronavirus-2019/interactive-timeline (last visited Oct 10,
2020).
2

Naming the coronavirus disease (COVID-19) and the virus that causes it, WORLD HEALTH ORGANIZATION [WHO],
https://www.who.int/emergencies/diseases/novel-coronavirus-2019/technical-guidance/naming-the-coronavirusdisease-(covid-2019)-and-the-virus-that-causes-it (last visited Oct 10, 2020).
3

WHO Coronavirus Disease (COVID-19) Dashboard, World Health Organization [WHO], https://covid19.who.int
(last visited Oct 10, 2020).
4

Harvard Health Publishing, Preventing the spread of the coronavirus, HARVARD HEALTH ,
https://www.health.harvard.edu/diseases-and-conditions/preventing-the-spread-of-the-coronavirus (last visited
Oct 10, 2020).
5

See Id.

6

See Ramesh Raskar et al., Comparing manual contact tracing and digital contact advice, ARXIV:2008.07325 [CS]
(2020), http://arxiv.org/abs/2008.07325 (last visited Nov 28, 2020).
7

Association of State and Territorial Health Officials [astho], COVID-19 Case Investigation and Contact Tracing:
Considerations for Using Digital Technologies, 4. (2020)
8

See Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC), Contact Tracing: Using Digital Tools, 1.,
https://www.cdc.gov/coronavirus/2019-ncov/downloads/digital-contact-tracing.pdf (last visited Dec. 13, 2020)
9

See How Digital Contact Tracing Slowed Covid-19 in East Asia, HARVARD BUSINESS REVIEW, 2020,
https://hbr.org/2020/04/how-digital-contact-tracing-slowed-covid-19-in-east-asia (last visited Nov 28, 2020); see
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reported COVID-19 deaths globally in October 2020.10 A reason for this vast difference in
outcomes could be attributed to the steps taken to control the spread COVID-19. Although 81%
of Americans own smartphones,11 the United States does not have a national exposure
notification app,12 and individual states vary in their contact tracing methods.13 Although the
digital contact tracing initiatives taken overseas intrude into the freedom of citizens far more than
would be allowed under U.S. law, this paper argues that there is a lawful path through the
COVID-19 pandemic that utilizes digital contact tracing.
This paper will look at the digital contact tracing efforts implemented by other nations
and assess how similar measures could operate under enacted and proposed United States laws.
Part I will overview the history of contact tracing and its effectiveness in prior disease outbreaks.
Part II will delve into the digital contact tracing efforts implemented by South Korea and
Singapore. These summaries will include: the digital contact tracing efforts taken, the laws that
authorize these efforts, the public’s reception, and the overall effectiveness of the efforts. Part III
will overview the digital contact tracing efforts in the United States, including proposed
legislation aimed at user privacy. This part will focus on two proposed legislations: the Exposure

also Coronavirus Disease 2019 (COVID-19) WHO Thailand Situation Report (2020), WORLD HEALTH ORGANIZATION
[WHO], HTTPS://WWW.WHO.INT/DOCS/DEFAULT-SOURCE/SEARO/THAILAND/2020-03-19-THA-SITREP-26COVID19.PDF?SFVRSN=6F433D5E_2 (last visited Dec. 13, 2020) (explaining the meaning of “flattening the curve”).
10

Global Epidemic Situation, WORLD HEALTH ORGANIZATION [WHO], https://www.who.int/docs/defaultsource/coronaviruse/situation-reports/20201012-weekly-epi-update-9.pdf (last visited Nov 28, 2020); See id.
(reporting a cumulative death toll of 212,229 in the United States, but only 432 and 27 in South Korea and
Singapore, respectively.)
11

Demographics of Mobile Device Ownership and Adoption in the United States, PEW RESEARCH CENTER: INTERNET,
SCIENCE & TECH, https://www.pewresearch.org/internet/fact-sheet/mobile/ (last visited Nov 28, 2020).
12

Mitch Leslie, COVID-19 Fight Enlists Digital Technology: Contact Tracing Apps, ENGINEERING (BEIJING) (2020),
https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC7492143/ (last visited Nov 28, 2020).
13

See State Approaches to Contact Tracing during the COVID-19 Pandemic – The National Academy for State
Health Policy, , https://www.nashp.org/state-approaches-to-contact-tracing-covid-19/, (last visited Nov 28, 2020).
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Notification Privacy Act and the Public Health Emergency Privacy Act. Part IV will analyze
which provisions of the ENPA and the PHEPA would best restrain the digital contact tracing
efforts used in South Korea and Singapore if they were to be implemented in United States. Part
V will conclude this note with a final recommendation and recap of the following analysis.
Part I – The History of Contract Tracing
Manual Contact Tracing
Contact tracing is the process of identifying and monitoring people who may have been
exposed to someone with an infectious disease, in order to locate other potentially infected
individuals.14 “For a highly contagious respiratory disease such as COVID-19, a contact could be
anyone who has been nearby.”15 Traditional contact tracing involves specially trained public
health staff helping an infected individual recall everyone they have had close contact with
during the time they may have been infectious.16 Traditional contact tracing is well established17.
Surveillance and containment programs, such as the Leicester Method, were successful in

14

1 1 (July 09, 2020) COVID-19: Digital Contact Tracing and Privacy Law 1.

15

Timothy M. Persons, Science & Tech Spotlight: Contact Tracing Apps, U.S. GOV'T ACCOUNTABILITY OFF.,
https://www.gao.gov/assets/710/708405.pdf (last visited Oct 3, 2020); see also Contact Tracing for COVID-19, The
Centers for Disease Control and Prevention [CDC], supra note 3, (defining “a close contact for COVID-19 as any
individual who was within 6 feet of an infected person for at least 15 minutes starting from 2 days before illness
onset (or, for asymptomatic patients, 2 days prior to positive specimen collection) until the time the patient is
isolated”).
16

Coronavirus Disease 2019 (COVID-19), CENTERS FOR DISEASE CONTROL AND PREVENTION [CDC] (2020),
https://www.cdc.gov/coronavirus/2019-ncov/php/principles-contact-tracing.html (last visited Oct 9, 2020).
17

Persons, supra note 15.

142

VOL. 10 (2022)

identifying cases of Smallpox and quarantining contacts.18 Contact tracing was not only used19,
but “crucially important” during the SARS outbreak in 2003.20
Digital Contact Tracing
Similar tracing efforts, combined with physical distancing and self-isolation, would be
likely to achieve control of COVID-19.21 However, as of June, 2020, only seven states and the
District of Columbia have a sufficient contact tracing workforce, and 37 states do not meet the
estimated need of contact tracers.22 This lack of contact tracers can be attributed, in part, to a
28% cut in federal funding and a reduction of 50,000 jobs due to the 2008 recession.23 Also as of
June 2020, many states are relying on the National Guard or volunteers to fill the gap.24 Digital
contact tracing (DCT) is the use of technology, such as smart phones, to aid in the manual
contact tracing workflow. Digital contact tracing has the potential to address this shortage of

18

F. Fenner, D. A. Henderson, I. Arita, Z. Jezek, I. D. Ladnyo, Smallpox and its Eradication , 275, 493 - 515 (World
Health Organization, 1988). (describing the essentials [of the Leicester Method] as being the prompt notification of
cases, the isolation of those cases in a hospital, and quarantine of all immediate contacts).
19

Christl A. Donnelly et al., Epidemiological determinants of spread of causal agent of severe acute respiratory
syndrome in Hong Kong, 361 THE LANCET 1761–1766 (2003).
20

Kin On Kwok et al., Epidemic Models of Contact Tracing: Systematic Review of Transmission Studies of Severe
Acute Respiratory Syndrome and Middle East Respiratory Syndrome, 17 COMPUT STRUCT BIOTECHNOL J 186–194
(2019).
21

Adam J. Kucharski et al., Effectiveness of isolation, testing, contact tracing, and physical distancing on reducing
transmission of SARS-CoV-2 in different settings: a mathematical modelling study, 20 THE LANCET INFECTIOUS DISEASES
1151–1160 (2020).
22

Selena Simmons-Duffin, As States Reopen, Do They Have The Workforce They Need To Stop Coronavirus
Outbreaks?, NPR.ORG, (June 18, 2020), https://www.npr.org/sections/health-shots/2020/06/18/879787448/asstates-reopen-do-they-have-the-workforce-they-need-to-stop-coronavirus-outbre (last visited Oct 10, 2020); see
also Fitzhugh Mullan Institute for Health Workforce Equity, GWU Contact Tracing Workforce Estimator,
https://www.gwhwi.org/estimator-613404.html (last visited Oct. 12, 2020).
23

Crystal Watson et al., A National Plan to Enable Comprehensive COVID-19 Case Finding and Contact Tracing in
the US, Association of State and Territorial Health Officials [astho], 8.
24

Simmons-Duffin, supra note 22.
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manual contact tracing by creating a system that would automatically notify individuals who are
potentially exposed to an infected person 25
Digital contact tracing enables more efficient tracing of those infected and notification to
those at-risk.26 DCT can be implemented through a variety of technologies.27 The major system
adopted in the U.S. and Europe is called “exposure notification,” a term created by Google and
Apple to distinguish their system from direct contact tracing. Exposure notification has gained
significant traction in some countries throughout the current COVID-19 pandemic. Google and
Apple have even collaborated on an exposure notification system so users of their phones may be
quickly notified of a possible exposure.28 The advantages of exposure notification is that it works
even if the user does not know they were exposed or by whom they were exposed.29 Exposure
notification utilizes Bluetooth, Global Positioning System (GPS), or both.30 However, the
Google/Apple system uses only Bluetooth.31

25

CDC, supra note 16.

26

CQ Roll Call Staff, Digital contact tracing needs strong privacy laws Lowenstein attorney says, ROLL CALL
WASHINGTON DATA PRIVACY BRIEFING (2020)
27

See astho, supra note 7. (describing multiple technologies for enhancing manual contact tracing).

28

Exposure Notifications: Helping fight COVID-19, EXPOSURE NOTIFICATIONS: HELPING FIGHT COVID-19 - GOOGLE,
https://www.google.com/intl/en_us/covid19/exposurenotifications/ (last visited Nov 15, 2020). (describing Google
Apple Exposure Notifications as “a joint effort between… [the companies]… to enable Bluetooth technology to help
governments reduce the spread of Covid-19); See also Exposure Notifications Frequently Asked Questions, APPLE |
GOOGLE, https://www.blog.google/documents/73/Exposure_Notification_-_FAQ_v1.1.pdf (last visited Sep 29,
2020).
29

astho, supra note 7.

30

Id. at page 6.

31

Exposure_Notification_-_FAQ_v1.1.pdf, supra note 28.
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Early in the COVID-19 pandemic, a range of DCT tools were being developed.32 Several
of these proposed to use either GPS alone or in combination with Bluetooth technology.33
Bluetooth allows electronic devices, such as cell phones, to connect to one another using
short-range radio waves.34 For contact tracing purposes, these radio waves would measure the
distance between Bluetooth enabled devices and notify the users if two signals come close
enough together.35 Most phones sold today, including some non-smartphones,36 have Bluetooth
capabilities.37 The breadth of this technology makes Bluetooth-based exposure notification an
obvious contact tracing supplement.38 However, Bluetooth technologyis not a perfect solution.
Bluetooth signals can be unreliable in measuring distance39 and requires users to have their

32

Demonstrating 15 contact tracing and other tools built to mitigate the impact of COVID-19, , TECHCRUNCH ,
https://social.techcrunch.com/2020/06/05/demonstrating-15-contact-tracing-and-other-tools-built-to-mitigatethe-impact-of-covid-19/ (last visited Nov 19, 2021). See also Digital tools for COVID-19 contact tracing, WORLD
HEALTH ORGANIZATION, https://www.who.int/publications-detail-redirect/WHO-2019-nCoV-Contact_TracingTools_Annex-2020.1 (last visited Nov 19, 2021). Table 1 details how proximity tracing / tracking tools can use GPS
or Bluetooth, as well as the consideration for implementation. Id.
33

Id. See also Muhammad Shahroz et al., COVID-19 digital contact tracing applications and techniques: A review
post initial deployments, 5 TRANSPORTATION ENGINEERING 100072 (2021).
34

Jeanette Ferrara, How do Bluetooth devices work?, SCIENCELINE (2016), https://scienceline.org/2016/04/how-dobluetooth-devices-work/ (last visited Feb 15, 2021).
35

Patrick Howell O'Neill, Bluetooth contact tracing needs bigger, better data, MIT TECHNOLOGY REVIEW,
https://www.technologyreview.com/2020/04/22/1000353/bluetooth-contact-tracing-needs-bigger-better-data/
(last visited Feb 15, 2021).
36

Jon Stone, The Best Non-Smartphones for 2020: Which Should You Buy?, THE INFORMR (2011),
https://theinformr.com/cell-phones/p/best-basic-phone-10094/ (last visited Feb 15, 2021).
37

Mike Chaussee, Does My Cell Phone Have Bluetooth?, ND ASSISTIVE (2014), https://ndassistive.org/blog/does-mycell-phone-have-bluetooth/ (last visited Feb 15, 2021).
38

See generally S. O’Dea, Smartphone users 2020, STATISTA , https://www.statista.com/statistics/330695/numberof-smartphone-users-worldwide/ (last visited Feb 15, 2021) (noting that smartphone users surpass three billion,
with some countries over 100 million).
39

O'Neill, supra note 31.
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phone turned on (and on their person) at all times.40 Bluetooth also requires the user to install
third-party applications onto their device to utilize this method.41 The third-party application is
required to provide the key location and time information that Bluetooth does not collect.
GPS information collection is another contact tracing technique. GPS is a system of
satellites, owned by the U.S. government, that send signals to receivers on Earth to determine the
receiver’s location.42 For contact tracing purposes, GPS offers several advantages over
Bluetooth. First, a third-party application would not be required to collect the time and location
data mentioned above.43 Also, GPS location information can be used to track the movements of
infected users and ensure user compliance with quarantine measures.44 Further, GPS is globally
available and is present on modern smartphones.45
Combining the advantages of both Bluetooth and GPS technologies could provide much
of the information needed to aid manual contact tracers. Utilizing Bluetooth would alert a user if
they were in close proximity of an infected individual. Consensually given user GPS data can
show where an infected user has been and at what times. This would allow contact tracers to alert

40

CDC, Health Departments, CENTERS FOR DISEASE CONTROL AND PREVENTION (2020),
https://www.cdc.gov/coronavirus/2019-ncov/php/contact-tracing/contact-tracing-plan/contact-tracing.html (last
visited Dec 13, 2020).
41

Id.

42

GPS.gov: GPS Overview, https://www.gps.gov/systems/gps/ (last visited Feb 15, 2021). See also How Does GPS
Work? | NASA Space Place – NASA Science for Kids, https://spaceplace.nasa.gov/gps/en/ (last visited Feb 15,
2021).
43
Using contact tracing and GPS to fight spread of COVID-19, , GPS WORLD (2020),
https://www.gpsworld.com/using-contact-tracing-and-gps-to-fight-spread-of-covid-19/ (last visited Nov 19, 2021).
44
Mobile Location Data and Covid-19: Q&A, HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH (2020),
https://www.hrw.org/news/2020/05/13/mobile-location-data-and-covid-19-qa (last visited Feb 15, 2021).
45

Shahroz et al., supra note 33.
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businesses or other public gathering places of the infected user’s presence.46 This information
could also be uploaded to contact tracing applications to alert other users who may have been at
that the same location at the same time, but who may not have come into close proximity of the
infected individual.
Countries that use Bluetooth notification or GPS information in their contact tracing
efforts have to choose how the data collected will be stored. This data can be stored on servers
usually controlled by the government (centralized), or on the individual users device
(decentralized). “The primary difference between centralized and decentralized communication
networks has to do with the question of who has control over the network itself.”47 In a
centralized method, for Bluetooth and GPS, user information is stored on the server owned by
the government48 or some other authority.49 Although this data is anonymized, there is potential
for misuse.50 Countries that have used centralized methods of storage have come under fire
because of its privacy invasive nature.51 A decentralized system, however, provides enhanced

46

See Vesedia proposes COVID-19 contact tracing platform, , GPS WORLD (2020),
https://www.gpsworld.com/vesedia-proposes-covid-19-contact-tracing-platform/ (last visited Nov 19, 2021).
Tracing
47

Alan Seal, Centralized vs Decentralized Network: Which One Do You Need?,
https://www.vxchnge.com/blog/centralized-decentralized-network (last visited Dec 12, 2020).
48

Cristina Criddle & Leo Kelion, Coronavirus contact-tracing: World split between two types of app, BBC NEWS, May
7, 2020, https://www.bbc.com/news/technology-52355028 (last visited Feb 15, 2021).
49

Dong Wang & Fang Liu, Privacy Risk and Preservation For COVID-19 Contact Tracing Apps 10. China’s Alipay
Health Code assigns users a status based on their GPS location. Id. Users who have been to a COVID-19 hotspot are
assigned a red code, indicating a 2 week quarantine. Id.
50

Joseph Duball, Centralized vs. decentralized: EU’s contact tracing privacy conundrum,
https://iapp.org/news/a/centralized-vs-decentralized-eus-contact-tracing-privacy-conundrum/ (last visited Feb 15,
2021). (theorizing a “social graph” that could be created through the information collected).
51

Bahrain, Kuwait and Norway contact tracing apps a danger for privacy,
https://www.amnesty.org/en/latest/news/2020/06/bahrain-kuwait-norway-contact-tracing-apps-danger-forprivacy/ (last visited Oct 22, 2020). see also Hermesauto, Norway halts coronavirus tracking app over privacy
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privacy52 because all the data collected is stored on the user’s device, not on a central database
accessible by the government.53 In a Bluetooth notification system, the individual devices
periodically download the anonymous identifiers of COVID-19 positive users. If the device has
come within range of one of these COVID-19 positive identifiers, the user will be alerted of the
potential exposure.54 In a decentralized GPS model, users track their own location, and will only
upload an anonymized report upon a positive COVID-19 diagnosis.55 In this model, the user
must also consent before any information is reported.56
Models suggest that sixty percent population use of a digital contact tracing app can
“substantially reduce” the spread of COVID-19.57 Most nations have yet to reach that amount of
participation.58 However, Professor Fraser at Oxford University says that all levels of exposure

concerns, THE STRAITS TIMES (2020), https://www.straitstimes.com/world/europe/norway-halts-coronavirustracking-app-over-privacy-concerns (last visited Oct 2, 2020) (stating that the Norwegian government halts its
contact tracing app amid privacy concerns).
52

astho, supra note 7.

53

Diana Plutis and Jaime-Heather Schwartz, When it comes to COVID tracing apps a decentralized model is
preferred, AVIRA BLOG (2020), https://www.avira.com/en/blog/when-it-comes-to-covid-tracing-apps-thedecentralized-model-is-preferred (last visited Feb 15, 2021).
54

Cristina Criddle & Leo Kelion, supra note 39. See also EXPOSURE NOTIFICATIONS: HELPING FIGHT COVID-19 - GOOGLE,
supra note 28.
55

Wang and Liu, supra note 49.

56

Id.

57

Univ. of Oxford, Digital contact tracing can slow or even stop coronavirus transmission and ease us out of
lockdown (2020), https://www.research.ox.ac.uk/Article/2020-04-16-digital-contact-tracing-can-slow-or-evenstop-coronavirus-transmission-and-ease-us-out-of-lockdown (last visited Oct 9, 2020) (modeling that
approximately 60% of the whole population using the application and adhering to the application’s
recommendations can stop the epidemic. Lower numbers of app users will also have a positive effect; we estimate
that one infection will be averted for every one to two users").????some of this is quoted, but where does the
quote start?
58

Craig Timberg et al., Cellphone apps designed to track covid-19 spread struggle worldwide amid privacy concerns,
WASHINGTON POST, https://www.washingtonpost.com/technology/2020/08/17/covid-tracking-apps-cellphones/
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notification use can reduce the number of cases.59 Fraser’s estimates show that even 15%
participation, combined with a well-staffed manual contact tracing workforce, could reduce
infections by 15% and deaths by 11%.60
Part II – Digital Contact Tracing in East Asia
A. South Korea
i. Tools Used
South Korea has implemented their Epidemic Investigation Support System (EISS) for
faster processing of patient data to better track infected Koreans.61 The EISS, for COVID-19
contact tracing purposes, now compiles cell phone location and credit card data to more
accurately determine if an infected individual’s travels resulted in social activity.62 For example,
the EISS was able to track an individual moving between a number of nightclubs and bars while
infected.63

(last visited Sep 29, 2020) (reporting that Ireland had 26 percent participation, Switzerland had 23 percent
participation, and France had only 68 people use their app to report a positive COVID-19 test in the first 3 weeks).
59

Univ. of Oxford, New research shows tracing apps can save lives at all levels of uptake, NEWS & EVENTS,
https://www.ox.ac.uk/news/2020-09-03-new-research-shows-tracing-apps-can-save-lives-all-levels-uptake (last
visited Oct 9, 2020).
60

Id.

61

Young Joon Park et al., Development and Utilization of a Rapid and Accurate Epidemic Investigation Support
System for COVID-19, 11 OSONG PUBLIC HEALTH RES PERSPECT 118–127 (2020).
62

Id. at 121 – 22. “After the entry of the confirmed COVID-19 case information, an epidemic investigator requests
the case information required for tracking via the system. As for information from the mobile network companies,
a corresponding request goes through the approval procedure via the Police Department. For card usage
information, the Credit Finance Association identifies the cards that the confirmed case in question
possesses, followed by a request to the corresponding credit card companies for information.” Id.
63

Hyonhee Shin, Hyunjoo Jin, Josh Smith, How South Korea turned an urban planning system into a virus tracking
database, REUTERS, May 22, 2020, https://www.reuters.com/article/us-health-coronavirus-southkorea-tracingidUSKBN22Y03I (last visited Nov 15, 2020).
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South Korea is also using apps to keep in touch with infected individuals.64 The Corona
100m (Co100) application can allow infected individuals to stay in touch with case workers and
can alert them if they come within 100 meters of a location visited by an infected person.65
Websites such as coronamap.site map positive COVID-19 diagnoses to help users avoid areas
that have been visited by other infectious users .66 A second application also uses GPS to ensure
the user does not break quarantine.67 The rate of smartphone use among Korean adults is 95%,
almost 20% more than the global median.68 South Korea’s comparatively low infection rate is
likely the result, in part, because of this high rate of smart phone usage combined with the EISS
and other technological combatants.69

64

Sarah Wray, South Korea to step-up online coronavirus tracking, SMART CITIES WORLD,
https://www.smartcitiesworld.net/news/news/south-korea-to-step-up-online-coronavirus-tracking-5109 (last
visited Nov 22, 2020).
65

Id.

66

Mark Zastrow, South Korea is reporting intimate details of COVID-19 cases: has it helped?, NATURE (2020),
https://www.nature.com/articles/d41586-020-00740-y (last visited Oct 9, 2020).
67

Wray, supra note 39. See also South Korea is watching quarantined citizens with a smartphone app, , MIT
TECHNOLOGY REVIEW , https://www.technologyreview.com/2020/03/06/905459/coronavirus-south-koreasmartphone-app-quarantine/ (last visited Dec 10, 2020). The “self-quarantine safety protection” app was created
by the Ministry of Interior and Safety. Id.
68

Laura Silver, Smartphone Ownership Is Growing Rapidly Around the World, but Not Always Equally, PEW RESEARCH
CENTER’S GLOBAL ATTITUDES PROJECT (2019), https://www.pewresearch.org/global/2019/02/05/smartphoneownership-is-growing-rapidly-around-the-world-but-not-always-equally/ (last visited Nov 15, 2020). (reporting that
nearly 100% of Korean adults have a mobile phone when non-smartphones are included).
69
Ministry of Health and Welfare, Coronavirus Disease-19, Republic of Korea, CORONAVIRUS DISEASE 19(COVID-19) ,
http://ncov.mohw.go.kr/en/ (last visited Nov 15, 2020).
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ii. Legal Authority
South Korea’s Location Information Act protects from misuse of location information.70 Article
15 subsection 1 of the Act states, “No one shall collect, use, or provide the location information
regarding an individual or mobile object without the consent of the individual or the owner of the
mobile object… unless otherwise provided in other Acts.”71 The Infectious Disease Control and
Prevention Act overrides the Location Information Act through articles outlining the
epidemiological investigation conducted during an infectious disease outbreak.72
iii. Reception and Effectiveness
The intrusive surveillance implemented by the South Korean government has drawn
criticism and has been seen as violating basic human rights.73 The personal data revealed by the
South Korean government, although vague, has led to users identities being discovered.74 This
surveillance is especially concerning to South Korea’s LGBTQ community.75 A COVID-19

70

Act on the Protection, Use, Etc. of Location Information, art. 1 (S. Kor.), translated in Korean Law Translation
Center, https://elaw.klri.re.kr/eng_service/lawView.do?hseq=43349&lang=ENG (last visited Nov 15, 2020).
71

Id. art. 29 (noting that emergency rescue agencies or police agencies may receive this information).

72

Sayuri Umeda, Regulating Electronic Means to Fight the Spread of COVID-19 (2020),
https://www.loc.gov/law/help/coronavirus-apps/korea.php#_ftnref23 (last visited Nov 15, 2020) (outlining the
details, timing, methods, and composition of epidemiological investigations and investigation teams).
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outbreak in May 2020 had been linked to the Itaewon district, a LGBTQ friendly area.76 The
community is now facing heightened discrimination following the source of the outbreak being
described as a “gay club.”77 Despite these concerns, over 63% of South Koreans are satisfied
with their governments COVID-19 response.78 Despite the privacy intrusions, South Korea has
been successful in managing COVID-19. South Korea has had 300 times fewer cases than the
United States79 and has only had 1,553 deaths due to the virus as of February 20, 2021.80
B. Singapore
i. Tools Used
Singapore was the first government to release a DCT app81 when it debuted it’s
“TraceTogether” program on March 20, 2020.82 The program uses Bluetooth signals to record
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encounters between devices.83 TraceTogether uses the BlueTrace Protocol.84 This protocol helps
blend decentralized and centralized methods of contact tracing by protecting the users
information from third-parties, but also allowing a centralized authority to access the information
to identify close-contacts.85 Alongside the smartphone application, this program introduced what
is called a “TraceTogether Token”.86 The TraceTogether Token is a piece of hardware that works
just like the smartphone application, minus the smartphone.87 Both the application and Token
capture proximity data through Bluetooth, not GPS.88 This proximity data is encrypted,89 stored
on the user’s device [smartphone or Token], “and only shared with the Ministry of Health
(MOH) if a user tests positive for COVID-19”.90 This information is deleted off of the user’s
phone after 21 days.91 Although the proximity data is stored on the user’s phone, limited
identifiable information is stored on government servers.92 This identifiable information includes
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the user’s contact number, identification details, and a random, anonymized User ID.93 Use of the
TraceTogether Program [smartphone appplication or Token] was to be mandatory for entrance
into public venues by the end of 2020.94 However, this mandatory check-in program has been
pushed back to a date in early 2021 that has yet to be announced.95
ii. Legal Authority
As explained above, the BlueTrace Protocol stores encounter history locally, on the
user’s device.96 Also, the BlueTrace Protocol white paper explains, “The health authority only
has access to this history when an infected person chooses to share it.”.97 However, these
descriptions may give a false sense of privacy to the program’s users because of the Singaporean
government’s legal authority to collect health data. If a user is contacted by the MOH, that
person is required by law to divulge the information recorded by the TraceTogether Program.98
The Infectious Disease Act 7(2)(a) states that for the purpose of a public health surveillance
program, the Director may require any person to furnish any information known to the person at
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those times.99 If you put together the facts that TraceTogether use will be mandatory in 2021 and
the user is required by law to give TraceTogether-collected information to the government when
requested, the privacy safeguards touted by the Singaporean government seem a little less
authentic.100 As described above, limited identifiable is kept on “secure,” yet centralized
government servers, and Bluetooth proximity data is stored on the user’s phone until the user
receives a positive COVID-19 diagnosis.101Although the MOH claims to only access the above
data for contact tracing purposes,102 the Ministry could, in reality, access the data whenever they
desire. In fact, the Minister of State for Home Affairs Desmond Tan revealed that this contact
tracing information “can also be used for ‘the purpose of criminal investigation.’”103
It should also be noted that by using TraceTogether, the user agrees to indemnify the
Government Technology Agency (GovTech) against any harms suffered either directly or
indirectly out of the user’s access to or use of TraceTogether.104 This means that if the user’s
TraceTogether-collected information is stolen by a third-party, the user has no recourse from the
government if they suffer harm from the third-party’s use of that data. Although Bluetooth
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proximity data itself is harmless, Singapore does have a history of cyber-attacks resulting in the
loss of personal data.105
iii. Reception and Effectiveness
Although much of the personal information involved is stored on the user’s phone and is
encrypted, there are still privacy concerns surrounding it. The Singaporean Prime Minister has
even acknowledged this when saying, “There will be some privacy concerns, but we will have to
weigh these against the benefits of being able to exit from the circuit breaker [Singapore’s
lockdown measures] and stay open safely.”106 Most of these concerns stem from the fact that
some information is kept on a centralized server controlled by the Ministry of Health.107
Whenever an infected user consents to having his data log decrypted by the MOH, this data log
includes the identities of users with whom the infected individual has come into contact.108 This
means that when a user consents to having their data log decrypted, the identities of their
contacts are being divulged to the MOH without those contacts’ consent and those users are no
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longer in control of their privacy.109 There is also pushback against the TraceTogether Token.110
A petition on Change.org has amassed over 54,000 signatures opposing the development of a
wearable contact tracing device.111 The petition claims that a mandatory contact tracing device is
an infringement upon their privacy rights and has the potential to turn Singapore into a
surveillance state.112 This claim is based on the belief that a wearable contact tracing device, such
as the Token, “would allow contact tracers to locate a person's whereabouts based on their
proximity to other persons' phones, cell towers, or potentially their wearable devices
themselves.”113
The claims of this petition are unfounded. In reality, the wearable device being pushed by
the Singaporean government does not collect geolocation data, nor does it have internet or
cellular connectivity.114 GovTech even invited members of the community to inspect the
TraceTogether Token.115 An inspection of the Token’s hardware revealed a small battery that
cannot be charged.116 Such a battery would last only a few hours if it were using GPS or Wi-Fi
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communication.117 Given the Token is supposed to run for several months on a single battery, it
is unlikely a GPS tracker, Wi-Fi radio, or cellular modem could be hidden in the device.118
TraceTogether had over one million users in April 2020. 119 Although an impressive
number, this means that in a random encounter between two people, there is only a 4% chance
that both people will have the application.120 Usage had doubled by September 2020, with over
2.4 million downloads, or 40% of Singapore’s population.121 By January 2021, usage had again
almost doubled to 78% participation, or more than 4.2 million people.122
Part III – Digital Contact Tracing in the United States
Through the first six months of the COVID-19 pandemic, most states did not utilize a
contact tracing application.123 Although usage had increased by the end of 2020, only twentyseven jurisdictions had implemented some form of a contact tracing application.124 In these
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jurisdictions, the Exposure Notification System by Google and Apple, Inc. (GAEN), is most
prevalent.125 A national server, which stores exposure notification information from all states
using GAEN, has also been established so individual state applications can work together.126
Although the GAEN framework makes privacy a priority,127 many people are “unable” to utilize
the technology because they do not have a smartphone, or are “unwilling to use the
technology.”128 A poll by the University of Maryland suggests that of the 82% of smartphone
users, only half would use an anonymous Google/Apple smartphone application.129 This lack of
participation could also be attributed to the lack of trust the American people have in the
government and big technology companies (“Big Tech”).130
Notwithstanding many Americans’ concerns, studies show that there are enough
Americans willing to use contact tracing applications to have a meaningful effect on the spread
of COVID-19.131 However, because of the states slow roll out of digital contact tracing programs,
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and the above-mentioned distrust of the government and Big Tech, a federal effort restrained by
legislation should be implemented to control the pandemic in the United States.
Section 2 of this Note shows that the comprehensive government strategies in South
Korea and Singapore have been effective in controlling COVID-19. However, such invasive
efforts would infringe on the rights of United States citizens. Therefore, regulatory restrictions
would be necessary to implement such efforts. Two potential bills could provide the regulation
necessary: the Exposure Notification Privacy Act (ENPA) and the Public Health Emergency
Privacy Act (PHEPA).
A. Proposed Legislation
i. Exposure Notification Privacy Act (ENPA)
The “Exposure Notification Privacy Act” (ENPA) was introduced on June 1, 2020, by
Senator Maria Cantwell of Washington State and Senator Bill Cassidy of Louisiana.132
Enforceable by the Federal Trade Commission, this Act focuses on regulating entities that
operate an “automated exposure notification service” and establishing privacy requirements for
those operators.133 An “automated exposure notification service” (AENS) is described in this Act
as “a website, online service, online application, mobile application, or mobile operating system
… that is designed, in part or in full, … for, the purpose of digitally notifying, in an automated

132
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manner, an individual who may have become exposed to an infectious disease ….134 This means
the ENPA would govern contact tracing applications, such as the Google/Apple framework.135
Section 3 of the ENPA focuses on gaining the public’s trust in automated exposure
notification services. This section provides that an operator of an AENS shall “collaborate” with
public health authorities.136 Although “collaborate” is not defined in the Act, Section 5(b)(2)
allows operators of an AENS (an operator) to transfer covered data to a public health authority
(PHA) “for public health purposes related to an infectious disease”.137 Section 3 next prevents
AENS from processing any user’s actual, potential, or presumptive diagnosis of an infectious
disease unless that diagnosis is “authorized.”138 Section 2 defines an “authorized diagnosis” as a
diagnosis that is confirmed by a PHA or a licensed health care provider.139 Section 3 then
requires an operator to publish guidance on their service functions, how to interpret notifications,
and any limitations on the service’s accuracy or reliability of exposure risk.140 Lastly, Section 3
deems it unlawful for an operator to engage is any deceptive act concerning an AENS and
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requires service providers to notify an operator or a PHA when it has knowledge of a potential
violation.141
Section 4 of the ENPA focuses on ensuring voluntary user participation and transparency
in how an operator uses a user’s data.142 This section first requires “prior affirmative express
consent” before an individual may be enrolled in an AENS.143 This section also gives the user the
power to determine whether the AENS processes their authorized diagnosis.144 This means that
even if an individual consensually enrolls in an AENS, the individual, who has received a
positive diagnosis, could choose to not have other users alerted of that diagnosis. Even if an
individual provides their consent to enroll in an AENS, the ENPA requires an operator to provide
to the individual “a clear and conspicuous means to withdraw” their affirmative express consent
of enrollment.145
Section 4 also requires an operator to make publicly available a privacy policy detailing
how the operator will collect, process, and transfer an individual’s covered data.146 This privacy
policy shall include: the operators identity and contact information, the processing purpose for
which covered data is collected, whether that data is transferred, the operator’s data minimization
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and retention policies, how an individual can exercise their rights under the ENPA, the operator’s
data security policies, and the privacy policies effective date.147 This section also requires that the
privacy policy be made available in all languages of the people to whom the AENS is
provided.148
Section 5 of the ENPA focuses on restricting the amount of data an AENS can collect and
how that data is used after collection.149 First, the section prohibits an operator from collecting or
processing any covered data beyond what is necessary for the implementation of the AENS for
public health purposes.150 An operator is also restricted from collecting data for any “commercial
purpose.”151 Next, this section restricts operators from transferring any covered data, with
exceptions.152 These exceptions allow an operator to transfer covered data to notify an enrolled
individual of a potential exposure, to a PHA for “purposes related to an infectious disease,” or to
a service provider for system maintenance or incident response.153 There is also an exception for
data transfers that are required for the operator to comply with a legal claim.154
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The section then continues to restrict the transfer of data, deeming it unlawful for any
entity, including Executive agencies, to transfer covered data unless it “is transferred in
connection with an investigation or enforcement proceeding…”155 The section then singles out
Executive agencies, prohibiting them from processing or transferring covered data unless it is
“for a public health purpose related to an infectious disease” or “in connection with an
investigation or enforcement proceeding…”156 Lastly, the Section allows data collection,
processing, or transfers for applicable research purposes, one of which being for
“development…of a…vaccine that relates to an infectious disease.157
Section 6 allows an individual to delete, or requires an operator to delete all covered data
of an individual, upon the request of the individual.158 This section also requires an operator to
delete an individual’s data within 30 days of receiving it.159 Operators also have to instruct their
service providers to delete covered data in accordance with this section.160 As in Section 5, there
is an exception for applicable research purposes.161
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Section 7 requires operators of an AENS to “establish, implement, and maintain data
security practices” to protect covered data.162 Such practices must include: (1) risk and
vulnerability assessment, (2) preventative and corrective action to mitigate such risks and
vulnerabilities, and (3) adequate notifications to individuals and law enforcement when a data
breach occurs.163 This section requires that the above data security practices “be consistent with
standards generally accepted by experts in the information security field.”164 Lastly, this section
makes it unlawful for “any person or entity to transmit signals with the intent to cause an
automated exposure notification service to produce inaccurate notifications or to otherwise
interfere with the intended functioning of such a service.”165
Section 8 makes unlawful the segregation or discrimination of an individual “based on
covered data collected or processed through an automated exposure notification service
(AENS).166 This section also makes unlawful the segregation or discrimination of any individual
based on whether or not that individual uses an AENS.167
Section 9 amends Section 1061 of the Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act
of 2004 to add language regarding responses to health epidemics.168 These amendments include
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mandatory reports “assessing the impact on privacy and civil liberties of Government activities
in response to the public health emergency related to the Coronavirus 2019 (COVID-19)”.169
ii. Public Health Emergency Privacy Act (PHEPA)
The “Public Health Emergency Privacy Act” (PHEPA) was introduced on May 14, 2020,
by Senator Richard Blumenthal of Connecticut.170 Enforceable by the FTC, this Act focuses on
protecting user data (referred to in the Act as “Emergency Health Data”), that is collected by
covered organizations, concerning the COVID-19 pandemic.171 “Emergency Health Data” is
defined in the Act as data that is “linked or reasonably linkable to an individual or device…, that
concerns the public COVID-19 health emergency.”172 A “covered organization” is defined in the
Act as “any person (including a government entity) that collects, uses, or discloses emergency
health data electronically or through communication by wire or radio,” or that develops, amongst
other things, mobile applications for responding to the COVID-19 public health emergency.173
Unlike the ENPA,174 these definitions encompass not only operators of an automated exposure
notification service, but all organizations that collect emergency health data.175 Additionally,
PHEPA’s definition of emergency health data tells us that the Act only applies to data that is
collected concerning COVID-19. The ENPA, on the other hand, applies to data that is collected
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by an automated exposure notification service (AENS). Although AENS are currently being used
to collect data concerning COVID-19, they could be used in the future to collect different kinds
of data.
Section 3, the most robust section of the Act, focuses on protecting collected emergency
health data.176 The Section begins by establishing a right to privacy (subsection (a)) and a right to
security (subsection (b)).177 Under the right to privacy, covered organizations that collect
emergency health data shall only collect, use, or disclose data that is “necessary, proportionate,
and limited for a good faith public health purpose.”178 These organizations must also ensure the
accuracy of their data and safeguard against the use of that data for discriminatory purposes.179
The right to privacy also restricts covered organizations from disclosing this data to a
government entity, unless that entity is a public health authority and the disclosure “is made in
solely for good faith public health purposes and in direct response to exigent circumstances.”180
Similar to the phrase “purposes related to an infectious disease” that appears in the ENPA,181 a
“good faith public health purpose” is not defined within the PHEPA. This phrase begs the
question of what purpose would satisfy this standard. Under the Section 3 right to security, these
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organizations must “establish and implement reasonable data security policies, practices, and
procedures to protect the security and confidentiality of emergency health data.”182
Section 3(c) prohibits covered organizations from collecting, using, or disclosing
emergency health data for any purpose not authorized within the Act. Where the ENPA is quite
general with its prohibition of collection for any “commercial purpose,”183 the PHEPA
specifically prohibits collection, use, or disclosure for the following: (1) commercial advertising
and e-commerce (including the training of machine learning algorithms related to commercial
advertising and e-commerce), (2) “soliciting, offering, selling, leasing, licensing, renting,
advertising, marketing, or otherwise commercially contracting for employment, finance, credit,
insurance, housing, or education opportunities in a manner that discriminates or otherwise makes
opportunities unavailable on the basis of emergency health data”, and (3) making unavailable
”the goods, services, facilities, privileges, advantages, or accommodations of any place of public
accommodation.”184 Section 4 of the PHEPA further addresses discrimination by prohibiting
government entities and covered organizations from restricting or denying the right to vote in a
federal, state, or local election on the basis of an individual’s emergency health data.185 If such
discrimination were to occur, the individual has the right to bring civil action to obtain
appropriate relief.186
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Section 3(d) makes it unlawful for any covered organization to collect, use, or disclose
emergency health data unless “the individual to whom the data pertains has given affirmative
express consent.”187 However, three other reasons could allow covered organizations to collect,
use, or disclose without an individual’s consent. These exceptions are when such is necessary
and for the sole purpose of protecting against “…illegal activity”, “…responding to…
information security incidents…,” or when the organization is required to by law. 188 After
consent is given, the individual can revoke that consent and the covered organization must
provide a mechanism for doing so.189 Once consent has been revoked, the organization has thirty
(30) days to destroy (or render not linkable to the individual) the emergency health data.190
Absent revocation of the user’s consent, three provisions in Section 3(g) dictate when user data
must be deleted. These provisions demand that emergency health data be deleted sixty (60) days
after collection or sixty (60) days after the Secretary of Health and Human Services, or
individual state governor, declares the termination of the public health emergency.191
Section 3(e) requires covered organizations to provide to users a privacy policy.192 This
policy must be clear and conspicuous, must describe how and for what purposes data is
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collected, to whom the data is disclosed to and why, the organizations data retention policies, and
how the individual may exercise their rights under the PHEPA.193
Section 3(f) requires organizations that collect the data of more than 100,000 individuals
to issue a public report every ninety (90) days stating the number of individuals that organization
collected, used, or disclosed emergency health data from, as well as the categories of data, the
purpose for the collection, use, or disclosure, and the third parties to whom it was disclosed.
Sections 3(i) and 3(j) provide that the PHEPA should not be construed to limit manual
contact tracing or to prohibit research.
Section 5 of the PHEPA requires that the Secretary of Health and Human Services, in
consultation with the U.S. Commission on Civil Rights and the Federal Trade Commission
(FTC), shall submit a report to Congress examining “the civil rights impact of the collection, use,
and disclosure of health information in response to the COVID-19 health emergency.”194 This
report is different than the one provided for under the ENPA. The report provided in Section 9 of
the ENPA assesses the impact on “privacy and civil liberties,”195 whereas the required PHEPA
report would only address the civil rights impact.196
Section 6 gives individuals a private right of action for violations of the PHEPA. Section
6(c)(1)(A) says that “Any individual alleging a violation of this Act may bring a civil action in
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any court of competent jurisdiction…”197 This is different than the enforcement authority granted
to the FTC under the ENPA.198 This means that instead of relying on the FTC to enforce and
punish PHEPA violators, the individual who was harmed by the violation may sue the covered
organization.199 Section 6(b) of the PHEPA also allows the States to bring an action on behalf of
their residents when they believe their residents have been threatened or adversely affected by a
violation of this Act, by any person subject to this Act.200
Part IV – Implementing Digital Contact Tracing in the United States
This part of the Note will analyze which provisions of the proposed bill, the PHEPA or
the ENPA, would best regulate the efforts taken in South Korea and Singapore, should the
United States implement similar efforts to attempt to control the COVID-19 pandemic.
A. Regulating South Korean Efforts in the United States
South Korea implemented a comprehensive, multiple angle approach to contact tracing.
This approach included non-mobile application based efforts such as GPS, cell phone location
tracking, and credit card usage data, as well as websites that help individuals avoid high risk
areas.201 South Korea also used mobile applications to keep individuals in contact with case
workers and to ensure infected, or potentially infected, residents did not break their quarantine.202
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Such efforts should be implemented in the United States to supplement the Bluetooth exposure
notification frameworks that are already being used.
i. Regulating Non-Mobile Application Based Efforts
Implementation of digital contact tracing (“DCT”) through GPS, cell phone location, and
credit card data in the United States would have to be governed under a regulation such as the
Public Health Emergency Privacy Act (PHEPA). In fact, between the two bills dissected above,
such efforts could only be governed by a PHEPA-like regulation because it regulates any entity
that collects emergency health data,203 whereas the Exposure Notification Privacy Act (ENPA)
only regulates health data collected by automated exposure notification services (such as the
Google Apple exposure notification mobile framework).204
A PHEPA-like regulation would put in place many safeguards that could help mitigate
the distrust of the government and big tech companies that many Americans have. PHEPA
Section 3(a) allows more Americans to feel that the collection of their private affairs will remain
limited and secure.205 Furthermore, the Act’s consent requirements, disclosure restrictions, and
mandatory publication of public reports would help Americans feel confident in the privacy of
their data and the impact their data is making. Lastly, Americans can feel safe knowing that,
should they suffer harm through a violation of PHEPA, the Act ensures that they have the power
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to bring a civil action against the violator.206 All of the above provisions is necessary for a federal
regulation to adequately safeguard people’s privacy.
However, the PHEPA is not without its faults. Section 3 of the Act provides that a
covered organization may not disclose emergency health data to a government entity unless that
entity is a public health authority (“PHA”) and the disclosure “is made [solely] for good faith
public health purposes and in direct response to exigent circumstances.”207 However, the quoted
phrase is undefined. This means that emergency health data could be disclosed to a PHA in
instances not intended by the legislators. If this exception were to exist in a data privacy bill, it is
recommended that “public health purpose” be defined narrowly to only cover purposes of
protecting the health and safety of the people. It is also recommended that “exigent
circumstances” be defined narrowly to encompass specific, identifiable events that directly harm
or threaten to harm the health and safety of the people. Lastly, a qualifier should be added to
ensure this exception is only allowed to be used if it is reasonable that the disclosure of data
would help mitigate the threat or harm imposed by the exigent circumstances. This means that
such an exception would only be available in circumstances where the people’s health and safety
were threatened, a specific and identifiable event was causing the threat, and it is reasonable that
the disclosure of data would help mitigate the looming harm.
The non-mobile application based DCT efforts implemented by South Korea should be
implemented in the United States. These efforts should include the tracking of GPS, cell phone
location data, and credit card usage. However, these efforts must be restrained by a regulation
akin to the Public Health Emergency Privacy Act. With minor modifications, the PHEPA would
206
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adequately cover all potential collectors of data to ensure the protection of all American’s
privacy rights.
ii. Regulating Mobile Application Based Efforts
Since the PHEPA covers any entity that collects emergency health data,208 and the ENPA
covers entities that operate an automated exposure notification service,209 both bills are viable
methods of restraining DCT mobile applications. These bills are similar to each other in that they
both, amongst other things: require affirmative consent, restrict data collection to only what is
necessary, restrict data disclosure to only what is necessary, and give the user control over their
data.210 Both bills would adequately restrain these applications; however, a combination of both
would be ideal. Although both bills require some kind of reporting, the ENPA requires reporting
on the impact of both “privacy and civil liberties,”211 whereas the PHEPA requires reporting on
only the civil rights impact.212 On the other hand, language defining what data is collected should
come from the PHEPA. The PHEPA’s definition of “emergency health data” is narrow in that it
only covers data “that concerns the public COVID-19 health emergency.”213 The ENPA’s
definition of “covered data” is much broader in that it is “any information that
is…collected…with an automated exposure notification service.”214 The narrower definition of
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the PHEPA would help to ensure that only user data pertaining to the COVID-19 pandemic, and
no additional and unnecessary information, is collected.
Furthermore, regulations, such as the ENPA or PHEPA, could raise DCT application
participation through adequate privacy policies. Whether a privacy policy exists for a given DCT
application varies by the state,215 and this can make it hard to determine whether and to whom
collected data may be shared. Although GAEN boasts privacy protection,216 applications, such
as The Corona 100m (Co100) application (to help individuals contact case workers), or the
“self-quarantine safety protection” application (used to track quarantined individuals), could be
implemented and brought up to a similar standard through proper legislation.
B. Regulating Singaporean Efforts Under the Proposed Legislation
Singapore’s key to success in fighting COVID-19 has been its mandatory TraceTogether
program. This program is implemented through either a smartphone app or Bluetooth device
provided by the government.217 Because any Bluetooth device that does not rely on a mobile
application would also fall outside the scope of the ENPA,218 a hybrid ENPA/PHEPA regulation
is necessary to adequately restrain such an effort. All the provisions described in Part IV(A)(i)(ii) above would be essential for this hybrid regulation. These provisions include narrow data
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collection, limited data disclosure, an even more limited data disclosure exception, mandatory
impact reports, and a detailed privacy policy.
Although postponed, Singapore is aiming to make the TraceTogether program
mandatory.219 A mandatory contact tracing program in the United States is unlikely. However,
given the smartphone usage in the United States,220 providing a Bluetooth device to those who
want one would be a step closer to the public participation percentage required for DCT
studies.221 The TraceTogether program is, in part, a centralized method of contact tracing because
it allows the Ministry of Health to access user information to identify close-contacts.222
Additionally, because of the decentralized Bluetooth exposure notification system,223 this type of
program could alleviate some privacy concerns that would occur under a South Korean-like
effort.
Whenever a user consents to having his data decrypted under Singapore’s TraceTogether
program, that decrypted data includes the identities of users that person has come into contact
with (so long as they use the application or TraceTogether Token).224 A program implemented in
the United States would need a way to confirm that no user’s identity is revealed, passively,
through the consent of a different user. This could be easily accomplished through a second
affirmative consent. For example, if User A receives a positive diagnosis and consents to his data
219
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log being decrypted by the operator, User B could receive an automated request (via a
smartphone through the DCT app or an automated phone call for users of a Token-like device)
first notifying them of a possible exposure, and then asking if User B wants to consent to having
their identify revealed for contact tracing purposes. This consent request would protect the
identity of User B because it would be automated and sent to the user alongside the anonymous
exposure notification prior to decryption.
Under the ENPA, this program would have to be implemented by a non-government
entity. This is because ENPA Section 2(11) defines an operator as something “other than a public
health authority.”225 Under the PHEPA, however, the “covered organization” could be a
government entity. The United States government would need to decide whether a government
agency or a private company would be more effective in gaining user support.
Part V – Conclusion
Digital contact tracing has the ability to “substantially reduce” the spread of COVID19,226 and the efforts of South Korea and Singapore have proven as such.227 Because of the slow
roll out of state digital contact tracing programs,228 the efforts by South Korea and Singapore that
are described in this Note should be implemented by the United States. These efforts are GPS
and cell phone location tracking, analysis of credit card usage data, websites that help individuals
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avoid high risk areas, mobile applications to keep individuals in contact with case workers and to
ensure infected or potentially infected residents do not break their quarantine, and the dispersing
of Bluetooth devices to Americans without constant access to a smartphone. The goal of this
implementation should be to lawfully expand digital contact tracing to as many consenting
Americans as possible. This program should be a joint operation between the private sector and
the federal government,229 funded by the government.230 Such a program may be able to increase
the percentage of willing participants to a number that will better combat the virus.231 However,
many Americans distrust of the government and Big Tech.232 Therefore, the United States must
pass a federal regulation to restrain potential misuse and protect the privacy of its people. The
two federal privacy bills currently proposed, the Exposure Notification Privacy Act (ENPA) and
the Public Health Emergency Privacy Act (PHEPA), do not individually go far enough to protect
privacy alone. However, a combination of the Acts, as well as added language to further protect
user data, could convince concerned Americans that their privacy will be protected, while
actually protecting that privacy.
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